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ST.. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
RES IPSA LoQurruR-EFFECT ON BURDEN OF PRooFn-The plaintiff, a minor,
brought an action for personal injuries sustained when a detached radiator
in the defendant's theater fell, breaking the plaintiff's leg, The trial court
decided that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would apply to these circum-
stances and instructed the jury that if the plaintiff proved these facts this
placed upon the defendant the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of
negligence and show by a preponderance of the evidence that neither he nor
his servants had been guilty of any negligence. The Supreme Court of
Missouri, sitting in banc, reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground
that giving such an instruction was prejudicial error. McCloskey v. Koplar
(Mo. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 557.
To understand the significance of this case it is necessary to analyse care-
fully the language of certain earlier Missouri decisions. Two fairly early
Missouri cases give considerable support to the doctrine of the instant case.
In Furnish v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1890) 102 Mo. 438, 13 S. W. 1044,
it was held that such an instruction was erroneous, but not sufficiently
prejudicial to justify a reversal. The court thought that it would have been
better to instruct that the proving of such facts merely made out a prima
facie case which, if unexplained, would justify recovery, but that this was
a mere technical nicety. This was shortly followed by a decision ruling that
it was not error to refuse to give such an instruction. Schaeffer v. St. Louis
& Suburban Ry. Co. (1895) 128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 331. However, all this
was upset by the celebrated case of Price v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co.
(19'09) 220 Mo. 435, 119 S. W. 932. The Supreme Court in bane upheld as
correct an instruction which placed upon the defendant the burden of proof
to "rebut this presumption of negligence and establish the fact that there
was no negligence on its part and that the injury, if any, was caused by
inevitable accident or by some cause which such highest degree of care could
not have avoided." The defendant had offered an instruction which stated
that the burden of proof always remained on the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's servants were guilty of negligence as alleged and specified in
these instructions. Judge Graves speaking for the Court, said that such
an instruction had no place where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied
and would completely destroy the whole doctrine of presumptive negligence.
This doctrine was followed in many cases, but there were signs which indi-
cated the dissatisfaction which certain judges felt with a view which was
contrary to the legal theory that the burden of proof is always on the plain-
tiff unless the defendant is relying on an affirmative defense. Indeed Judge
Graves (then Chief Justice) said in a dissenting opinion in a later case
that the point as to shifting the burden of proof had not been adequately
presented to the Court in the Price case and that the reason why he so
emphatically rejected the defendant's proposed instruction was not because
it misplaced the burden of proof, but rather because it required the proof
of specific rather than general negligence. Simpson v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
Ry. Co. (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 737 (the judgment after an instruction
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similar to that in the Price case was affirmed, but the judges could not agree
as to the reasons for the affirmance and two dissented). In Bond v. St.
Louis, San Francisco Ry. Co. (1926) 315 Mo. 987, 288 S. W. 777, the Court
followed the Price case but called it illogical as a rule of evidence. Judge
Gantt said that such a doctrine "must be regarded as one of substantive
law, adopted for the protection of passengers. It has been followed so long
that its enforcement must now be considered part of the public policy of
the state." In the McCloskey case Judge Ellison criticises the earlier cases
as not making a clear enough distinction between the burden of proof (i. e.
bearing the risk of non-persuasion of the jury) and the burden of evidence
(i. e. bearing the duty of producing enough evidence to satisfy the judge
and allow him to send the case to the jury). The res ipsa loquitur doctrine
only satisfies the burden of evidence, it does not change in any way the
burden of proof. Judge Ragland and Judge Henwood concurred in a sep-
arate opinion in which they said they agreed with everything said in the
majority opinion, but wished to express more strongly their view that the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine raised only a permissible inference of fact which
the jury might draw, but which it was not compelled to draw even if there
was no further evidence. Judge Gantt dissented on the ground that as a
matter of judicial administration it was better to place the true burden of
proof on the defendant once the facts on which the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
is based had been shown.
The result of the McCloskey case is to bring Missouri once more into line
with the orthodox position as to the effect of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
It is true that in many states the issue is still confused by the use of loose
language as to "inferences," "presumptions," "burden of proof," and other
like phrases without being careful to use these terms in their accepted tech-
nical sense. As the Supreme Court of the United States has well said the
circumstances to which the doctrine is applicable are such that they permit
"an inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference . . .
it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that
they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it."
Sweeney v. Erving (1913) 228 U. S. 233; Kleinnon v. Banner Laundry Co.
(1921) 150 Minn. 515, 186 N. W. 123; Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec-
tric Co. (1927) 100 Vt. 414, 139, Atl. 440.
It is disquieting that the principal case does not expressly overrule the
Price case, since some future court, desirous of making it more difficult for
a carrier to escape liability, might use the factual difference between the
two cases to retain the doctrine of the Price case when a carrier-passenger
relationship was involved. It is reassuring to note that in a still later case,
the Missouri Supreme Court speaks of the McCloskey case as expressly over-
ruling the Price case. Sanders v. City of Carthage (Mo. 1932) 51 S. W.
(2d) 529. If courts desire to extend the field of quasi-absolute liability, they
should do so by a clear statement that this is their purpose rather than by
distorting a rule of evidence. N. P., '34.
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